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ABSTRACT:
In this paper a mathematical model of governmental decision-
maker's problem of choice from a set of alternative cost-^benef it
streams is presented. The choice objects, costs, and benefits are
considered to be defined physically^ocially , in time, in space, and
by a state-of-nature. The decision-maker t s preferences with respect
to costs and benefits are represented by a utility index of the
standard type except that costs are assumed to be a disutility-
causing entity. The set of alternatives from which choice is
described is represented by a cost-benefit surface. The decision
problem is formulated as a maximization problem. Decision rules
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This paper tn concerned with a description of n governmental
decision-maker choosing umong alternatives whose costs and benefits
have been illuminated analytically. The decision-maker is considered
to be involved in a planning, programming and budgeting system and
to be responsible for at least some area where cost-benefit studies
can be helpful. The decision maker's study team is envisaged as
being given an assignment to develop the alternatives and their costs
















SIMPLIFIED GEOMETRY OF THE MODEL
FIGURE 1
The phenomenon to be described, then, is a governmental decision-
maker, his study team, and their interaction. In a very simplified
fashion Figure 1 shows a cost-benefit surface developed by a study
team. A decision-maker's indifference curves are also shown, as is
the subjectively selected optimum alternative. The details of the
study team's deliverations are not shown by this figure. They are
shown schematically in Figure 2.
As can be seen in the schematic, costs and benefits are produced
by the study team as an interrelated flow among benefit, component
systems, research-manufacturing, and cost submodels. The details of
the operational definitions of the variables will be given in Section
II. As can be seen by studying the schematic, basic resources (e.g.,
engineering hours, raw materials, tooling) are transformed into
system elements (e.g., in the military context, tanks, planes, trained
personnel). These system elements are the inputs to the component
systems submodel. The outputs of this submodel are the system
characteristics (e.g., in transportation, range, payload, speed, fuel
consumption) . These characteristics are produced from the system ele-
ments. Finally, characteristics are transformed into values of the
system benefit measures (e.g., in poverty programs, expected income
distributions)
.
The inputs to the cost model are characteristics, elements, and
resources. By use of the cost estimating relationships, the cost
model matrix can be computed and the cost measure (s) obtained. All
these input types are considered to allow for such phenomenon as
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SCHEMATIC OF THE STUDY TEAM'S DELIBERATIONS
FIGURE 2
estimation. The cost model matrix has columns for the time periods
of the analysis and rows for the system elements, The columns can
be grouped by research and development costs, investment costs, and
operating costs, if this is desirable. Some elements of the matrix
may, of course, be zero. The cost measure values are computed by
pre- and post-multiplication of the matrix by appropriate vectors.
For example, if present costs are to be computed, then the pre-
multiplication is by a sum vector and the post-multiplication is by
a vector of discount factors.
Such a disaggregated model can be used to study the surface
relating the various cost and benefit measures. Analogous to
production theory in economics, this is a production possibility
surface where each point is vectorially undominated. The surface
can be considered as some function of all cost and benefit measures
equal to zero — an implicit function. The implicit function is
interpreted with benefits as outputs and costs as inputs and is the
surface diagrammed in Figure 1.
The literature of mathematical models of such a phenomenon is
small. Heuston and Ogawa [1] and the references there are the appro-
priate ones. This paper attempts to broaden the mathematical frame-
work for describing the phenomenon of cost-benefit alternative choice.
As such, it is somewhat a synthesis of the previous papers and also a
generalization in that the previous models can be considered special
cases of the model presented here. Another major difference is the
stress here on the incommensurability of costs and benefits in many
problems. As such, commensurability can be considered as net benefit
measures, which, of course, are very desirable when available.
SECTION II
THE CHOICE OBJECTS
As discussed in the previous section, the decision-maker is
modeled as choosing from a set of cost-benefit vectors that is
generated by an analysis team. In this section the choice objects
of the decision-maker are given operational meaning. The choice
objects are the benefit measures and the cost measures., These
variables are assumed to have physical-social, time, space, and
state-of-nature attributes. In addition to these variables,
the exogenous variables where they are discussed in later sections
also are assumed to have these attributes. The attributes will be
discussed in turn.
The physical attributes of a measure have been discussed before
[1]. It is stressed, though, that the same physical and/or social
phenomenon can be measured in multiple ways — and they can all be
important. For example, Miller, et al„, [2] have listed the physical-
social (my terminology) measures of poverty as income (threshold,
relative, share of national income), assets (housing, consumer
durables, savings, insurance), and services (education, health,
neighborhood amenities, protection, social services, transportation).
In considering this model, the reader is urged to regard some of the
multiple measures as being associated with the same physical/social
phenomenon.
The second attribute is time dating. With this attribute, the
same physical/social measure at two different dates will be treated
as two different measures. In this fashion, choice object time
streams can be associated with a project. It is noted that the
time attribute is associated with such measures as present cost and
present benefits, since while they are calculated with many dates,
they are calculated as of some particular date.
The third attribute locates the measure of the phenomenon in
physical space. Hence, the same physical-social measure at two
different locations will be treated as two different measures. A
location is determined by categorizing the spatial extension of the
phenomenon into elementary regions.
The risk or state-of-nature attribute will be modeled in the
Debreusian manner [3]„ That is, the future will be modeled as a
time sequence of states-<of -nature. At any one date, the states-of-
nature are assertions concerning all that can conceivably happen
including natural phenomenon, technological change, political acts,
and the like. It is usual to model this as an event tree [4].
In cost-benefit analysis, particularly as used in the defense
department, the scenario has been an important tool. A scenario
seems to have no concise definition. However, it is used to mean
the background aspects of a given situation. Here, scenario will
be used to denote a unicursal path (a path with no steps retraced)
through the event tree. Hence, in a model with only two dates
(present and future), scenario and state-of-nature become synonymous
In summary, then, choice variables are defined to have an attribute
for the state-of-nature that could prevail at a given date.
The above concept of state-of-nature is extended here to include
the empirical relevance of alternative methods and models. As most
practitioners have undoubtedly noticed during a study, discussion
concerning the empirical relevance — "realism 11 — of alternative
methods and models is often heated and lengthy. It is clear that such
disagreement could be resolved by appropriate experimentation and
application of scientific procedures. However, since the time frame
of the decision does not always allow such experimentation and since
the resources for such experimentation may not be available, an
attribute of empirical relevance is included in the concept of state-
of-nature.
The choice objects, defined with physical-social, time, space,
and risk attributes, must also be scaled and given mathematical
structure. Here, the details of the scaling will not be considered
[5]. Rather, each measure is assumed to have an associated multi-
plicative scale. This scale is represented by the real numbers.
SECTION III
THE DECISION-MAKER'S UTILITY FUNCTION
As is usual in such models, the decision maker is assumed to
have a complete preference preordering with respect to the cost-
benefit vectors. In addition, continuous and strongly convex prefer-
ences are assumed. These assumptions assure that an ordinal scale
utility index, U, can be constructed [3]. Again, as is usual, the
utility index is assumed to have continuous second partial derivatives
Certain results also require the utility index to be concave, but
this is not assumed throughout the paper.
Unlike standard consumer theory in economics, all the choice
objects are not "utility producing 11 objects. Rather, costs are
"disutility producing" objects. Hence, the marginal utility of
costs is negative. To retain the positive marginal utilities, it is
assumed that costs are measured with a negative sign. In the two-
dimensional case, Figure 4 is the typical representation of indif-
ference curves or isoutility lines.
Since the utility index is known only up to a monotonic
increasing transformation, marginal utility here means the
rate of change of the transformed index with respect to the
original (always positive) times the original marginal
utility.
As is well known, the slope of an indifference curve measures the







the usual manner the negative of the slope of an indifference curve
will be defined as the rate of psychological xxxxxxxxxxxx substi-
tution. The x's are replaced by an appropriate modifier, as noted
in the next few sentences. When the "trade-off" is between cost m
and benefit & , the name will be the rate of psychological cost
2
m-benefit & substitution. This will be denoted as RPC E.S. This
m Jc
measures an individual decision-maker's willingness to gain additional
effectiveness at an additional cost. When two cost measures are
considered, the name becomes rate of psychological cost measures
substitution. This will be denoted RPC C S. It measures the
m a
It is noted that many names exist for this concept. The present
one was chosen to emphasize the subjective nature of this "trade-off."
2
E denotes benefits and C costs with the measure listed first
considered the dependent variable and the other the independent vari-
able. Since indifference curves are one-to-one correspondences, the
permuted rate of substitution is the inverse of the one defined. The
same convention will hold for isoquandt analyses.
decision-maker's willingness to substitute between two different
measures of resource use. Finally, when two benefit measures are
under consideration, the words are rate of psychological benefit
measure substitution. This is denoted RPE.E, S * It measures
the willingness to substitute between two measures of benefits.
As the word psychological connotes, choice by the decision-
maker is internal. This appears to be what some call "judgment."
In this paper "judgment" will be dichotomized into ethics or empiri-
cal relevance categories . The first category includes such con-
siderations as what should be the role of government, the size of
government, the "worth" of the citizens benefited by the project,
and the "amount" of consideration given to future generations. The
reader can undoubtedly supply many more. The second category includes
such items as the reliability of forecasting techniques, the relevance
of specific cost and benefit measures to the "real phenomenon," the
degree of approximation exhibited by different models, and the degree
to which "immeasurables" are "measured." Again, the reader can
undoubtedly supply many more. This last category includes all matters
of judgment which could be resolved by application of appropriate
scientific procedures. Presumably, in a world with costless informa-
tion this last category would not be needed. While it is important
to distinguish these categories, the decision-maker's preferences
seem to "mix them all up," and hence only one inseparable utility





The implicit function form of the cost-benefit function will
be used (H(E_, C_, r_) =0). To further illuminate its interpretation,
it is noted that some of the measures can be cost-benefit ratios,
net benefits, and rate(s) of return of benefit over cost. Clearly
many measures, particularly those just indicated, require costs
and benefits to be commensurable. In many instances this commensur-
ability does not apply. When commensurability is considered, it seems
natural to permit at least some benefit measures to be unrestricted
in sign. This is more general and presumably a better description
model but greatly complicates the exposition. Hence, since no essen-
tial notions are lost, benefit will be treated as nonnegative and
costs nonpositive in what follows. The cost measures may be further
restricted by the existence of budget limitations (B=(B
, ...,B ,...,B ))
SECTION V
THE DECISION PROBLEM
In the previous sections, a governmental decision-maker's problem
is discussed in terms of its component parts: the choice objects, the
utility function, and the cost-benefit function. Here, these compon-
ents are interrelated by framing the decision-maker's problem as maxi-
mizing his utility subject to the cost-benefit function.
11
In formal term? the decision problem is:
Max U C li, * •••» E , •••> E j c., •••• C •••» C^)
h.
,


















where the symbols are interpreted as follows:
U( ): utility function
E : l benefit (or effectiveness) measure
th , .
c : m cost (or resource use) measure
m
ll( ): implicit cost-benefit function
B* : maximum permissible leve.1 of the i cost
1
measure. Note that B* £ for all i. This
is frequently called the oudget level,
r^: various parameters as cost-estimating relationship
coefficients
.
While it is possible to analyze the model as just stated, it is
more convenient to transform the problem to consider costs and budgets
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-X H(E, -C) - I X (C. - B.)o
i-1 x x X
The necessary conditions for a maximum are:
(1) it - xoit £0 £or '-^ 2 L
, (2) ~- + X ^- - X s; for i - 1, ..., Mdc o 3c m ' '
m m
(3) H(E, -C , r) -
i (4) C - B £ for m - 1, .... M
m m
(5) E , C i for all i,m
9. m
And, also, the following, theorems are of interest:
<6) If C £ B , then X -mm m
i
(8) If ~- + X ~- -• X < 0, then C -
3c o 3c . m m
m m
From these conditions, various decision rules will be derived and
interpreted. This will be done first for two benefit measures,
secondly for two cost measures, and lastly for one benefit and one
13
cost measure. The latter two will be considered when budgets are
binding and not binding. Finally, it is noted that if the utility
function is concave and the production function convex, then the
above conditions ((1) - C5)) are also sufficient. Thus, the decision-
maker's rules given next will also be sufficient under these circum-
stances.
Decision Rule for Two Benefit Measures
Since the budget constraints do not affect the decision rule for
two benefit measures, they can temporarily be neglected. However, it
is possible that one or more of the inequalities in (1) are strict
inequalities. Thus, there are cases where (a) both benefit measures
are at a positive level and the associated relations in (1) are
equalities; (b) one benefit measure is at a positive level, the other
at a zero level, and the associated relations in CI) are an equality
and strict inequality, respectively; and (c) both benefit measures
are at a zero level and strict inequalities hold in both associated
relations in (1). The case where the benefit measure is at a zero
level and the associated relation in CI) is an equality is not con-
sidered here. This is not meant to imply the unimportance of this
"tangency" case, only that the essentials are brought out with the
other cases.
When equality relationships in CI) are considered with both
associated benefit measures at a positive level, the circumstances
are similar to the "interior solution" so familiar to the student of









"jE" " -JjT a ' l
3E 3E
a a
Using the terminology developed in previous sections, the decision
rule is for the decision-maker to equate the rate of psychological
benefit measure substitution to the rate of benefit measure transfor-
mation. This decision rule in conjunction with the others will be
necessary (and sufficient) depending on the assumptions concerning
i
the utility function and production function as discussed above.
In case (b) where there is a strict inequality and an equality,













This form of the decision rule assumes benefit measure a is at a
zero level and benefit measure it at a positive level.
As, the reader probably suspects, the inequality form of the
decision also applies in case (c) . The difference is that with case
(c) both benefit measures are at a z,ero level. The Importance of
cases (b) and (c) is that since measures are physical/social, time,
space, and state-of-nature attributed, a choice at a zero level for
some measure appears likely. For example, a decision-maker's attitude
toward the likelihood of occurrence of some scenario or the empirical
relevance of some model can occasion choice at a zero level.
15
Decision Rule for Two Cost Measures
Inasmuch as the nonbinding budget constraint cost measure cases
are analogous to the above benefit measure cases, these will be con-
sidered first. The binding budget constraint case will be considered
thereafter.




"1u"~ " "ItT a + m
3c 3c
a a
This rule occurs when both cost measures are at a positive level and
the relationships in (2) are equalities (case (a) , above) . It also
occurs if one or both of the cost measures are at a zero level and
there is tangency of the indifference curves and production lsoquandts
on the boundary of the positive orthant. This decision rule requires
the decision-maker to equate the rate of psychological cost measure














of the decision rule is applicable when cost measure m is at a posi-
tive level an ' cost measure a is at a zero level or both are at a
zero level. Again, this is important in that cost measures also have
all the attributes discussed for benefit measures and a zero level
has an interpretation; for example, with respect to the decision-
maker's preference over space and time.
16
When the budget level Is binding, the associated Lagrange multi-
pliers are no longer zero. The decision rule developed here will be
for equality relationships in (2) and, positive Lagrange multipliers.
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But it is now recognized that these ratios of partial derivatives are
rates of substitution and transformation either internal or external.
Thus the above equation can be written.
*
X (RE„C T) - (RPE„C S)
m
. m
I m I m
X " (RE C T) - ; (RPE C S)
I la la
^ote that since the Lagrange multipliers are positive, this
equality can be rearranged into an inequality with Just the internal
and external "trade-offs" present.
17
Since the various Lagrange multipliers can be interpreted as the mar-
ginal utility of the associated budget level, the ratio of two multi-
pliers can be interpreted as the rate of psychological substitution
between budget level types
.
When one cost measure is constrained by a budget level and another
not, the decision rule can be written as
/3U * _1
(RC C S) - (RPC C S) = (X ) 'ma ma a\3 c
x m
The term on the right side of the equation can be interpreted as the
rate of psychological substitution between cost measure m and
budget a , the binding budget
.
The analysis between a cost measure m and a benefit measure Z
proceeds in the same manner. The formal results are shown in Table 7
and can be interpreted as in the preceding cases.
SECTION VI
DEMAND FOR COSTS AND BENEFITS
In an analogous manner to the economic theory of consumer or pro-
ducer choice, the necessary conditions imply that the optimal level
of benefits and costs are functions of the parameters of the cost-
benefit production function and the various budget levels. For
simplicity, the analysis begins with the case where the necessary
conditions (1), (2), and (.3) are equations, and benefits and costs
are all positive (5). Thus, budgets may be neglected.
For the sufficient conditions to an inequality constrained maxi-
mization problem where the functions are only assumed dif ferentiable,
see King [7]„ As King shows, neglecting slack constraints on the
problem introduced no dif f iculties . In fact, this exposition provides
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With the foregoing assumptions, the necessary conditions consist
of f. + M + I equations (equation sets (1), (2), nnd O)) and
L + M + 1 variables (LK/s, MC 's, and IX ). The Implicit functionI'm o .








, ..., rQ )
I - 1, .... L
C = C (r. , . .
.
, r ) m » 1, . .
.
, M
m m I o
\ =» X (r, , . .., r )O O 1 o
where the symbol designates the optimal value. The next stage of










The slope analysis proceeds exactly as in traditional consumer
theory. First, the necessary conditions equations are differentiated
with respect to r . This yields the set of linear equations shown on
the next page. 2 If the matrix of the set of linear equations is
denoted by D, then the solution of the equations takes the form
k v = l k I m«l km k
where I) „ Ik tlio ro factor of the 'm row nnd 9. column.
ml
To understand the nature of this equation for the slope, the
following minimization problem is considered. This problem,
1The reader may check to verify that the hypothese of the theorem
are satisfied in this case.
2Thia form of D is obtained by differentiating the equations as
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Min 11 (E, -C, £)
8. t.
U(E, -C) - U*
E„, C > for all l,m
* nt
has the Lagranglan function:
<KI. -C, M ) - H(E, -C, r) - yQ [U(E, -C) - U*]
Applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem 1 the necessary conditions are
, nN an 3u n
'
.
(9) 3E7 " Wo^ " ° j -1 ' — « n
: (10) * |~ + % |r " " 1. •••» M
m m
(11) U(E, -C) - U* -
The reader may quickly check that the decision rules derived from




Differentiating equation sets (9) , (10) , and (11) yields the set
of linear equations exhibited on the next page. 2 Denoting the matrix
of this set of equations by G, it can be shown that
|
D|-r 2 |o|. : '.
Using this information, the first two terms of the equation -— can
3E '•
. That is, the first two terms are theeasily be shown to be
3rk
U
'The reader may verify that the hypotheses are satisfied.
2This form is obtained by differentiating the equations as given
and multiplying the first L and the last one by minus one.
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change induced in the optimal value of the I benefit measure by a
change in the k parameter holding utility constant. In traditional
consumer theory, this is known as the substitution effect and it will
be so named here.
In the original muximization problem, the cost-benefit production
function being 61* Implicit form is equal to zero. However, at this
stag** of l In* nn.i I vm I n i\ nh I It of the entire production tturfnce 1m to
be studied. This In most easily done by Hotting tin* Implicit pro-
duction function equal to a parameter z and varying it, holding all
the r 's constant. As would be expected, this changes the nature
of the linear system of equations on page 23 not at all. The variables
are now partial derivatives with respect to z. Finally, the right
side of the equation set is a column vector of zeros except for the








surface holding the r ' fl constant. By removing ("T^r") from













This is the direct production effect on E. due to a change in r.
,
and will be called the rate of benefit measure % productivity with
24
respect to .1 t'h«n>»e Ln parameter r. (HI'", r. f) . Hence, tin: slope of







In the analogous manner to consumer theory, the latter term will be
called the income effect.
Thus, when one of the production function shift parameters \
changes, the change in demand for a benefit can be resolved into two
parts. The first will be called the private substitution effect,
and the latter, the private income effect;. A similar relationship
occurs with cost measures.
As in traditional consumer theory, private substitutes, compli-
ments, superior and inferior "goods" may be defined. The definitions
i
given below are extensions of the familiar consumer definitions.
Private Substitutes
Two benefit or two cost or one benefit-one cost measure will be

































Two benefit or two coat or one benefit-one coHt meaHure(s) will
be called private complements If the negative signs In the private
substitute definition are positive and the positive signs remain
unchanged.
Private Superior Measures


















In consumer theory these are called the weak definitions. The gross
definitions can also be defined and are left to the reader. It is
emphasized that this is a set of definitions referring to the private
subjective — decisions of the decision-maker.
liecause there are so many cases of constraints, slack or binding,
and necessary conditions ((1) and (2)) being strict inequalities or
equations, no catalogue of rcsultH will be given. Cases of interest
can be considered by the reader. The bindingness or slackness of
constraints can be handled using the theorems in King [7], Strict
inequality necessary conditions can b,e converted to equalities by use
of a slack variable. Care must be exercised, however^ when some cost
26
equals its budget level, and the indifference surface and production
surface are tangent at that point. Here the derivative does not exist
where a cost measure is considered with respect to a change in its
own budget level. One-sided derivatives (to the optimum point) can,
however, give information. More generally, this multiplicity of
cases yields no sign of slope information that appears useful. Finally,
note that some slopes may be zero, and hence the substitute/compliment
and superior/inferior definitions are not usable. One could extend
these concepts to include a zero slope, or possibly preferably con-




In this paper a mathematical model of a governmental decision-
maker's problem of choice from a set of alternative cost-benefit
streams is presented. The choice objects, costs, and benefits are
considered to be defined physically/socially , in time, in space, and
by a state-of-nature. The decision-maker r s preferences with respect
to costs and benefits are represented by a utility index of the
standard type except that costs are assumed to be a disutility-causing
entity. The set of alternatives from which choice is described is
represented by a cost-benefit surface. The decision problem is formu-
lated as maximization problems. Decision rules are derived. Com-
paratibe statics results are given.
While a general framework for understanding decision-making in
this context is presented, it must be noted that this does not
complete the research needed in this area. There is opportunity for
use of the Qualitative Calculus. In addition, this model is an
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